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FOREWORD 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Marshall Space 
Flight Center and to Auburn University for the opportunity offered by 
this study. The individuals delineated in the Appendix were very enthu­
siastic and gracious in their response to this study, and the real message 
is from them. However, as in any area in which science, engineering, 
and philosophy merge almost to a metaphysics, the author alone must 
of necessity assume responsibility for conclusions and presumptions. 
This he willingly does in presenting this material. 
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IINRr(UJ)UCTION 
Man's first footprints on the moon and all that was required to put 
them there were the result of one of the most dedicated management and
 
engineering efforts 
ever put forth! The "giant leap" immortalized in 
Armstrong's words from the moon surface was, too, a dramatic beginning 
of an intense, concentrated scientific effort that has many ramifications 
far beyond that spellbinding moment. The impact on this country, in 
technological capability, in world prestige, in educational influence, in
 
motivation of large segments of our populace; and indeed, its impact 
on
 
the world itself is without parallel in mankind's technological achieve­
ments to date. In fact, spin-off alone, in the form of increased medical
 
knowledge, manufacturing techniques, management know-how, instrumen­
tation related to pollution detection and 
control, and applications of this
 
new found "ocean" of zero gravity most likely will pay many 
times the 
original investment. Additionally, the new perspective of looking at our 
unique earth from space has far reaching implications in more down-to­
earth problems. 
The problems solved in this venture were many, and were of diverse 
natures; technical, human, manufacturing, management, ad infinitum. 
In retrospect, what can one identify of this successful endeavor which would 
*help maintain and enhance such a capability, which would also be applicable 
to meeting other needy requirements, and which would surely help us to 
-1­
better educate future generations of technical and management people? 
When one considers what was done to insure the success of the Saturn 
launch vehicle system, many functions come to light which played a domi­
nant role. The term "system engineering" will be used throughout this 
report to identify these functions. It is not meant to imply any particular 
organization nor any dominant role by any particular discipline of system 
engineers. Nor is there any claim of-a Utopian application of system engi­
neering. Perhaps a system approach would be a better term; in any event, 
the broadest idea of system engineering is the intended connotation, as 
many of the key elements of Saturn success were accomplished under 
various names. 
Three definable aspects stand out above all others. There is little 
need to dwell upon them at length, but they must be considered indispen­
sable and of primary importance in the application of any system approach ­
no matter what problem is being attacked! These are "must" basics: 
0 a well-defined goal to be accomplished within a reasonably well­
defined time frame 
adequate technical specialist strength to solve the problem -0 intense rigor is required as complexity increases. 
computer capability of a reasonable level - if the problem is 
0 difficult enough to require a systems approach, it usually is 
difficult enough to require considerable computer analysis and 
simulation. 
While these will be referred to later in this report, they will not be repeatedl' 
emphasized in comparison to their importance. They just simply have to be 
there, or the chances of success will be practically non-existent! 
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Any attempt to identify any short-length semantics as being descriptive 
of the key to the Saturn/Apollo success would be only partly adequate. Just 
recently, 51 pages in a national journal15 were allotted to discussing the 
Apollo spacecraft success essentials alone. Within the last month, the 
author came across a 262-page congressional subcommittee staff study5 on 
a similar subject. It, of course, had much greater resources available 
and is a valuable corollary to this study. 
A history of system engineering would in itself be an exhaustive under­
taking. Reference 13 is a short overview of some of its background. 
The selected references give further insight into its development. Inter­
estingly, W. F. Durand in the Scientific Monthly 9 in 1917 stated that 
one of the triumphs of the twentieth century will be the making of 
some effective progress toward the establishment and development of a 
science of the use of science." 
The most important "history" included here, however, is to recognize 
the source of the system engineering capability of the NASA/MSFC team. 
Predominant here would be the "forcing function" afforded each individual 
by his own education and experience background which plays such an im­
portant part in shaping one's approach to solution of problems. Individual 
backgrounds would be too diverse to trace conclusively, but the experience 
gained in system design of increasing complexity under the Army Ballistic 
Missile Program - Redstone, Jupiter, Pershing, etc. - certainly played a 
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major role in the Saturn success. The inhouse capability developed over 
the years on such programs and on the Saturn I was a most successful 
training experience. For many of the team members, working together 
on complex systems all the way back to Peenemunde has to be recognized 
as being of major significance. 
Perhaps one would think, in the reading up to this point, that this 
system engineering has been done within the confines of a single organi­
zation, or with the imposition of certain types of paperwork. Such is not 
the case ! Only recently at MSFC has any organization been clearly identi­
fied and charged with system engineering functions. What a lesson this 
should be to those who, perhaps sincerely, think that organizational setups 
and paper requirements can do the job! There is no substitute for compe­
tent technical specialists and dedicated individuals (no matter of what 
organization they are a part) who strive constantly to assure success of 
the system. Certainly, however, organizational arrangements can help 
instead of hinder. 
This report is based on conferences, interviews, a literature search, 
and personal observations. Primary among these are about three dozen 
taped interviews with key Saturn engineers and managers, mostly of MSFC. 
The appendix lists interviewees and describes study ground rules. There 
are several other papers which resulted from this study; while some ideas 
are probably duplicated, the reader may want to look at references 6, 7, 
and 1. Reference 6 was written during the early part of the study and perhaps 
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expresses the author's personal viewpoint to a greater extent than his 
observations of NASA/IMSFC which are emphasized herein. * 
Hopefully, a "coherent whole" is the result, with Hayek'sl 2 observation 
in mind: "... if the results of the discussion(s) are not ultimately turned 
into a coherent whole by an individual mind, they are likely to be inferior 
to what would have been produced unaided by a single mind. " 
Certainly, the impact on The chance tothe author has been great. see 
such a broad picture (especially following Ph.D. work in Engineering 
Mechanics and teaching in the area of aeroelasticity, structures, vibrations, 
and system analysis using analog/hybrid and digital computers) has been 
very instrumental in my development as an"individual and as an engineering 
educator. It has reinforced considerably my personal convictions that engi­
neering education can play an important role in shaping the engineering. 
student's all important attitudes and perspective in an equal manner to his 
technical competence, that effective teaching can play a more significant 
role in student development, that - given the chance and the resources ­
technology can produce successful solutions to immensely difficult real­
world problems. 
Finally, the author emphasizes that the reader should not "raise a flag" 
of his particular idea of what system engineering entails as he reads this 
report. Rather, look at the report as a collective judgment of many key 
Saturn engineers and managers, of many authors from the literature, and of 
the observations of a broadly experienced university engineering professor. 
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Before reading further, if you, the reader, see little practical use of 
space, the following true story is appropriate (reprinted from a recent 
letter from Dr. E. Stuhlinger of MSFC to a nun in Africa in response to 
her query, "Why explore space?"): 
. "About 400 years ago, there lived a count in a small town in 
Germany. He was one of the benign counts and he gave a large 
part of his income to the poor in his town. This was much appre­
ciated because poverty was abundant during medieval times and 
there were epidemics of the plague which ravaged the country 
frequently. 
"One day, the count met a strange man. He had a workbench 
and little laboratory in his house, and he labored hard during the 
daytime so that he could afford a few hours every evening to work 
in his laboratory. 
"He ground small lenses from pieces of glass; he mounted the 
lenses in tubes and he used these gadgets to look at very small 
objects. The count was particularly fascinated by the tiny creatures 
that-could be observed with the strong magnification and which 
nobody had ever seen before. 
"He invited the man to move with his laboratory to the castle, to 
become a member of the count's household and to devote henceforth 
all his time to the development and perfection of his optical gadgets 
as a special employee of the count. 
"The townspeople, however, became angry when they realized 
that the count was wasting his money, as they thought, on a stunt 
without purpose. 'We are suffering from this plague, ' they said, 
'while he is paying that man for a useless hobby!' 
"But the count remained firm. 'I will give you as much as I can 
afford, ' he said, 'but I will also support this man and his work, 
because I know that someday something will come out of it. ' 
"Indeed, something very good came out of this work, and also 
out of similar work done by others at other places: the microscope. 
It is well known that the microscope has contributed more than any 
other invention to the progress of medicine and that the elimination 
of the plague and many other contagious diseases from most parts 
of the world is largely a result of studies which the microscope made 
possible. 
"The count, by retaining some of his spending money for research 
and discovery, contributed far more to the relief of human suffering 
than he could have contributed by giving all he could possibly spire 
to his plague-ridden community. " 
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SPECIALISTS AND GENERALISTS: A COMPARISON 
It should be understood from the outset that (a) technical specialist 
strength and (b) overall system "awareness" claim an equal "place in the 
sun" in the Saturn success story. Lack of balance between the two spells 
ultimate doom for the system. It is true that the two capabilities inherently 
tend to draw an individual towards one or other of the "positions" making 
communication sometimes difficult. 
Interestingly, the people who have been promoted the furthest within 
MSFC have usually gone through a cycle of gaining (a) and then (b); and of 
these, those who perhaps have had the strongest background in (a) have had
 
an almost traumatic experience upon the addition of (b). A comparison, or 
actually, a contrast of extremes isalluded to in the literature by Hamiltonll:
 
"The generalist will in many instances have nothing specific to 
'hang his hat on' except the fact that he understands the way in which 
the total business (or system) functions. ... by the nature of his job, 
he must maintain exceptional communication links to all parts of the 
(organization). He is generally better at dealing with people - moti­
vating and communicating - than are very specialized men. The 
generalist does not gain anything by hoarding information or refusing 
to accept information from outside sources ... he is an expert at 
utilizing and disseminating information... 
"On the other hand., the specialist is selling expertise. He is a 
focal point of knowledge about a particular subject. Much of his pur­
pose is to become a source of information for the company. To lose 
the aura of authority would be to lose the title, specialist. The spe­
cialist also never seems to generate much personal contact among 
people in other functions ... Associates of a specialist are usually in 
closely related fields ... Both kinds of men are needed in all functional 
areas... the best men.. .are neither pure generalists, or pure special­
ists - but a combination of both." 
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The dilemma of conflict between these important types of men is not 
unique to NASA, of course. Perhaps keeping this problem from dominating 
the Saturn/Apollo Program is really the key to success. Of primary im­
portance in doing this was the leadership capability and the recognized 
technical capability of key MSFC people. Drs. von Braun, Rees, and 
Rudolph and others evidently played a tremendous role in; first, having a 
very respected technical reputation; secondly, possessing an acute system 
awareness and sensitivity for opinions of others; thirdly, having a superior 
ability to question perceptively; and fourthly, developing the ability to 
follow a question all the way down to the "nuts and bolts, " when necessary! 
They were both specialists and generalists I 
This inherent conflict between generalists and specialists can be better 
understood by looking at a few ideas presented in interviews. One relevant 
idea is the contrast between difficulties associated with using instruments 
or devices to obtain data upon which to make a decision, and the extraction 
from human beings of data upon which to make decisions. This necessary 
change for a specialist turning generalist was described by several as 
"traumatic. " Some felt that if any one point should be emphasized makingin 
a systems approach successful, it would be the establishment of a well quali­
fied group of technical experts for the management team to understand the 
"biases" of a group of people (biases in this use is not meant derogatorily, 
but is indicative that educational and professional background and develop­
ment experience all play a very important part in how people solve problems). 
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Another contrast exists between the strong technically motivated special­
ist and his move into the management structure. This necessitates a change 
from a "do it myself" philosophy to one of being able to delegate responsibility 
and to select people with traits so that a manager has confidence that they can 
do a given job as well as he can. He must learn to compromise, too, in this 
role-change. 
One cannot assume that all good technical specialists can become good 
engineering managers. And yet, as years go by, the specialist often sees 
that the managerial route is the only route of increasing reward. So he must 
decide to go that route, or accept his continuing technical role without bitter­
ness to those who "go the other way." Could more NASA emphasis be placed 
on rewarding the strong specialist in ways different from the management 
route? In any event, management positions should continue to be filled with 
technically qualified people - the importance of this is attested to by the rest 
of this report. 
On the other hand, at the entering level, it is precisely the narrowly 
educated specialist that NASA seeks the most. A quote from the president 
of Dupont 17 is very appropriate here: 
"The call for generalists has become conventional wisdom ­
almost a cliche' - but there is an open question about our effectiveness 
in answering that call. The call will be met only if industry (NASA?) 
lives up to its public pronouncements, places a premium on breadth, 
and provides inhouse, or in cooperation with universities, opportuni­
ties for technical men to build both their broad-scale and specifically 
technical talents. If we truly want broad-gauge men and women, we 
must provide jobs that challenge their intellects and an environment 
conducive to their ideals and aspirations. Otherwise, we will be 
saddled with mediocrity, and deserve the sad fate that mediocrity 
will bring us."
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Still, as one interviewee commented: "It might be, that to be a generalist, 
one should have demonstrated specialist ability first... 1' Perhaps such a 
demonstration though, could come in the years of technical education, or 
could occur parallel to an acute "system awareness" development rather 
than in what often occurs - "technical island" development. 
Reference 6 by the author points out that the system engineer idea 
has been likened to the letter "T" signifying depth in one field (at least), 
but breadth at the surface. A well formed T would be best; no vertical 
member and the T becomes just a dash, a very shallow education. However, 
with no horizontal member on the T, it becomes an "I" and the person looks 
only at his specialty, his ideas, his solutions; and organizational objectives 
become shaped in personalities, power politics, and personal whims rather 
than the search for the realistic best solutions. 
The need for more of a balance between generalist traits and specialist 
traits should not be interpreted as encouraging less depth, or less technical 
capability. If there was one consensus item from all the interviews conducted, 
it was the equation: 
MSFC technical specialty strength = Saturn success 
Reference 24 documents this in a more quantitative manner. 
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A HISTORICAL PARALLEL?
 
The status quo is not an assurance of continuing success. An interesting 
parallel exists in Toynbee's-analysis of history2 6 (perhaps one of the best 
observers of history "systems" to date) and NASA's pattern up to now. Fig­
ure 1 compares some of the appropriate parallels to a point. Whether NASA 
is at the "peak, "1 or will follow the parallel from the "peak" on, remains to 
be seen, but the warning should be clear. 
Toynbee also cites that, among other things, 
(a) 	 the decay of technical achievement has been a result, not a cause, 
of breakdown (of a civilization), 
(b) 	imitation is the only way in which the "uncreative majority" can 
follow the leadership of the creative leaders, and 
(c) 	a real danger exists in the leaders becoming "infected with the 
mechanicalness of their followers" (leading to an "arrested" 
civilization). 
Also, "history shows that the group which successfully responds to one 
challenge is rarely the successful respondent to the next . . . those who have 
succeeded once are apt, on the next occasion, to be found 'resting on their 
oars'. " Finally, Toynbee points out an example in which a civilization 
"failed because, intoxicated'by its own success, it was tempted to make 
illegitimate use of political weapons in pursuit of inordinate aims." The 
point here is that parallel in growth is without question; therefore, the 
warnings of history should be appropriately recognized! Any successful 
organization must especially guard against loss of its creative capability. 
11-­
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NASA/MSFC SYSTEMS CONjCEPTS - REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE ROLE 
Marshall System Approach and System Engineering 
System engineering can be defined as: 
The process of applying science and technology to the study and 
planning of a system so that the relationships of various subsystems 
are fully established before designs are committed. 20 
Other references break this process down into a sequence of events for 
further illustration. Many other definitions could be promoted (see ref. 6, 
for instance), but only a slight modification of the above seems desirable 
based on the Marshall interviews, with perhaps the systems approach a 
slightly preferable label: 
The process of applying science and technology to the study and 
planning of a system so that the relationships of various subsystems 
are thoroughly explored before designs are committed, and so that a 
large amount of flexibility is built into the. design for difficult-to­
foresee performance requirement changes. 
Continued success of the Saturn vehicle and adaptability of the system to 
unforeseen missions are a striking testimonial to this process - by whatever 
name under which achieved! Of course, everyone has 20-20 hindsight; the 
fact that few have similar foresight requires the obtainment of all the flexi­
bility possible. Just as it is usually the "unloaded" gun that causes most gun 
accidents, so it is with problems with the system - so often it is the problem 
not thought of that "rears its ugly head" or "falls through the cracks" I Built 
in flexibility can ease the impact when such things become apparent. The 
recent Apollo 13 incident is a tremendous example of this flexibility. One­
engine-out capability, and the capability to perform a yaw maneuver at 
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lift-off to compensate for less than originally planned-for swing arm retrac­
tion rates, are good examples, too. Certainly redundancy, modularity, the 
clustered engine concept, and capable guidance systems all contributed to 
the Saturn flexibility features. The computer capability with its quick response 
time must be considered an eminent prerequisite to reanalysis and quick 
decision capability when necessity arises. 
Explicit, detailed, step-by-step procedures as a follow-on to the definition 
are the usual approach in most system engineering articles. Perhaps, first, 
one should differentiate between system analysis, systems management, and 
what we might call -- technical system engineering.- , It is assumed that system 
analysis includes the mathematical modeling or other simulations which are 
required to analyze the response of a system. It is something you do after 
defining fairly explicitly - a system or a subsystem. It comprises numerical 
methods, optimization techniques, computer techniques, and numerous specific 
discipline approaches. Systems Management comprises the organizational and 
management structure; procurement, schedule and cost aspects; and in general 
the activities peripheral to explicit engineering activities. Technical systems 
engineering is much more difficult to identify due to (a) the subtleties involved 
(see ref. 7), (b) the interrelationships required, and (c) the wide divergence of 
opinion held by so many people of its merits, need, or advantages. The re­
mainder of this section is devoted to trying to convey in as succinct a fashion 
as practical - many of the thoughts expressed by key NASA/MSFC people. 
Many textbooks and papers document ordered processes involved in systems 
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engineering 4, 16, 22, 25 The final part of this section summarizes the 
"Marshall Circle, " or ordered process, but no consensus exists within 
Marshall technical management on explicit semantics of this at present. 
Summary of Desirable Influences 
There were a number of influences, desirable and undesirable, which 
had an impact on technical system engineering of the Saturn. They are 
presented here in certain categories in order to attempt to structure their 
presentation. Order of importance is not implied in numbering them. 
Occasional use of quotes are for appropriate interview comments and for 
Saturn or technical "slang" which best puts across certain ideas. As an 
example of typical contrasting influences and the necessity to suppress 
some while nurturing others, Figure 2 serves to point out their importance 
in reaching singleness of purpose. This section is followed by a summary 
of undesirable influences which is then followed by another section of 
other identifiable influences (which could not be adequately or succintly 
described in the summaries). 
It is difficult to categorize all desirable influences, but one important 
category can be called attitude. Some of the outstanding ones were 
attitudes toward: 
i. 	 System awareness -- This was an intense overall perspective 
possessed by dedicated individuals who realized the necessity 
for cooperative efforts on subsystem development in order to 
assure success of the overall system. 
2. Technical issues -- The concentration on these by management, 
working groups and panels, laboratory discipline groups, and in 
program reviews was without letup. Individual perceptive 
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questioning and addressing problem issues in "recovery plans" 
played a very important part. 
Flexibility -- A recognition that this had to be an important part 
(a) of system development, (b) in meeting system requirements, 
and (c) in adapting to unforeseen requirements was essential. 
This was indicated by many key decisions (clustering of engines, 
earth orbit-lunar orbit mission "plateaus", digital launch tape, 
etc. ) and a realization that "fix it until it meets the specifications" 
might not be the best attitude to have. The "pay off" has been 
very evident, for instance in the "slingshot" maneuver and in 
the safe return of Apollo 13 following a catastrophic failure. 
"Accepted risks" -- *This was an attitude which not only meant 
agreeing to do things (at least tentatively) in some less-than-
Utopian manner, but also meant recognizing the necessity to 
"jump in at mid-stream" in attacking many problems. ("Things 
can nearly always be done better in a more sophisticated manner, 
and rarely does one get to attack the problem from the optimum 
beginning. ") 
Specialist communication -- This was an attitude which allowed 
"the individual technical specialist to scream within the frame­
work of the overall program--within his discipline--when he did 
not think (or know) that something was going correctly;" which 
allowed him to run a test program when questions arose. 
Technical truth -- An attitude existed which placed final technical 
authority in discipline laboratories when conflicts reached a 
stalemate. Program constraints of time and cost were not 
allowed to inhibit or close out search for technical truth. When 
conflicts could not be settled, it was confidence in the individual 
technical man closest to the problem which "ended" the search 
for the needed technical truth. 
Failures -- A controlled failure attitude necessitated constantly 
promoting the idea, "let us do all we can to prevent any and all 
failures, of course; but if one occurs, what do we do then?" 
Too, failures were "planned for, " or anticipated. It was assumed 
some would occur in testing, for instance. No failures were leftI 
unexplained 
Work environment -- Individuals were allowed to "pursue their 
own specialty in the framework or the environment of several 
specialties and yet to see how all of these fit together so as to com 
out with something good collectively. 
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9. Automatic responsibility -- Automatic assumption of responsibility 
concerning discipline areas on Saturn by laboratory technical 
management was very significant. There was no wait for work 
orders, prdgram management, etc. -This resulted in the earliest 
possible attack on problem areas. 
10. 	 Discipline -- "All elements were structured to provide the kind 
of discipline which forced the right kind of actions to be taken by 
everybody on both sides--government and contractor. I 
11. 	 All success planning -- The "all up" concept promoted by Dr. 
George Mueller of NASA Headquarters was a contrast to the 
human tendency to do things sequentially--a prove/add, prove/ 
add sequence of development. This concept put the same pressures 
on the development of every subsystem in the Saturn "stack" 
concurrently. 
12. 	 Testing -- Every job rendered perfectly along the wak would have 
rendered this a useless task, but a realistic attitude required 
extensive testing of nearly every conceivable nature in order to 
assure success.
 
13. Post flight and post test evaluation -- No mission or test firing 
occurred without being followed by an intense effort to extract 
all possible technical considerations from available data. 
Numerous specific techniques were used which had desirable influences 
on Saturn. Many of the more quantifiable and technical techniques are 
documented to some extent in the literature today. Their necessity is 
without question. But, interestingly, interviews identified the following 
broad techniques as being just as instrumental in successful engineering 
of systems: 
1. Optimal technical solution identification -- This function, performed 
by laboratory discipline groups or under contract, postulated 
optimal solutions in the sense that the best solution without time 
and cost constraints was theoretically optimal. 
2. Solution tempering -- The practical realization that cost and time 
constraints had to modify the optimal solution usually resulted 
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in modifications to more realistic solutions, but never to the 
point of violating technical integrity. This resulted in a sort 
of technical "check and balance. " 
3. 	 Early consideration of long lead-time activities -- The initiation 
of planning for such activities prior to final definition of the 
system "headed off" many down-the-road problems and was 
very instrumental in meeting goals in relation to schedule in 
particular. For instance, the development of tooling and 
capability to manufacture large metal ingots and large propulsion 
tanks, starting construction of test sites, quality assurance and 
logistics planning, determining test stand needs, and planning 
for cryogenic distribution systems are a few examples. Much 
of this planning was accomplished outside of project engineering 
groups who probably would not have gotten to such planning early 
enough.
 
4. 	 Traceability development -- Documented traceability of all 
system hardware was essential (a) to trace trouble quickly upon 
improper functioning and (b) to locate similar items for further 
investigation or replacement. Paperwork was the essence of 
this traceability! A delicate balance between too much and too 
little is mandatory. 
5. 	 Individual responsibility documentation -- In addition to project 
responsibilities, horizontal responsibilities were assigned to 
individuals and documented for all to see in the Saturn control 
room. Function, software, and hardware responsibilities were 
included. Reputations, corporate and individual, were "laid on 
the line! " This helped "all to play to the same sheet of music.'' 
6. 	 Phased project planning -- This "grew up" during the middle 
and end phases of Saturn as people began to appreciate how 
things might have been if a new start had been possible. The 
four successive phases of (a) preliminary analysis, (b) definition, 
(c) design, and (d) development and operations are a real 
appreciation for a systems approach. 
7. 	 Unique working relationship -- Contractor and MSFC efforts 
reemphasized the old adage that "two heads are better than one!" 
Government test programs concurrent with contractor hardware 
development were very important. MSFC technical capability 
was "on call. " Their "deep penetration" into technical issues 
with contractors was resented at first, but at last deeply 
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treasured. The Saturn program success is a real testimonial 
that system evolution occurs faster under such an arrangement 
as the MSFC-contractor working relationship. "Things were 
sometimes done that were wrong, but everybody got a crack 
at making it right. Then, the right people got together in the 
right room at the right time and solved the problem. " 
Inherently unique to the Saturn program were several important 
desirable characteristics. For instance, the digital launch tape -was an 
extremely important feature which enabled a major portion of critically 
timed sequencing of events at launch to be placed within a piece of computer 
software. This could then be checked and rechecked and modified without 
major rework. Akin to this was the intense effort to monitor critical 
measurements in relation to predetermined tired line" values during 
mission countdown and throughout the mission. 
Inherent to the missions was the fact that it lended itself to thorough 
mission analysis on each piece of hardware for each mission. Essentially 
this was done by the establishment of performance requirements by system 
oriented individuals who were mostly in program management, in the 
laboratories, or with contractors. 
Schedule "launch windows" were the basis for mission schedules. 
Everybody knew this and they became a primary motivation as all other 
assignments were extrapolated back from mathematically based launch 
optimum times. Tremendous costs in dollars and national prestige 
were known to be the result of missed launches. 
Manned space flight helped each worker identify vicariously with 
each astronaut. It was not hard to get each person to ask himself, 
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"Would I bet my own life on the quality of what I am doing?" Calculated 
motivation schemes like the Manned Flight Awareness Program played 
an extremely important role in success. They were definitely not a frill! 
Once the program was begun, political interference was always at a 
minimum. The necessary time span required to accomplish major goals 
made this imperative. 
There were constant efforts to "keep the lines open" in all internal 
communications between technical and management sides, between NASA 
centers, and vertical and horizontal within involved organizations. 
Continual emphasis was given to "prevent parochial atmospheres from 
forming, " and to prevent "funnels at the top" from developing. Extensive 
telephoning, travel, etc. had an important impact. Intercenter communica 
tions were eased whenever people from one center were used to help start 
other efforts. This was especially evident in the MSFC-KSC relationship. 
"Tiger teams, " short term appointments of capable individuals with 
related interests and diverse disciplines, were often used to pull together 
more needed facts to aid in joint assessments on just where problems 
were most likely to be. Reviews of such assessments occurred periodicall 
Finally, significant miscellaneous good influences were (a) testing 
and engineering analysis before really having to, (b) the "easier" trade 
off decisions promoted by firm goal definition and "tight" time schedules, 
and (c) widespread application of any known experience (internal or externa 
to MSFC) related to hardware problems. 
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Summary of Undesirable Influences 
The largest group of these undesired, but ever present, influences 
could be categorized as tendencies which relate to the following: 
1. 	 Presentation of a false front -- There is a "human tendency 
to present only the 'goodness' of things and not the 'badness'. 
People will cover up the problems, waiting for someone else 
to slip the deadline date." The reluctance to admit "being in 
over one's head" was very real, individually and corporately., 
2. 	 Organizational prejudice -- Organizations often arrived at 
"positions" to elevate their own importance more than to really 
search for technical truth. 
3. 	 Ultra-conservatism in planning -- People tended to protect 
themselves 	from blame for failure, especially in "pushing to do 
' it differently" in the early planning stages. 
4. Forgetfulness of required rigor and depth -- Memories had to 
be refreshed concerning the intense rigor and depth of analysis, 
simulation, testing, etc. which had been required to arrive at 
realistic solutions on pre-Saturn programs. "Dead ends" and 
failures in Saturn development were the most effective "refresher! 
5. 	 Trade off narrowness -- Too small a look at interfaces in trade 
off analyses were continually guarded against. "One must 
continually look closely at the interface, then back off and look 
again at the total system." "Nuts and bolts" queries resolved 
this. 
6. 	 Single level systems thinking -- There was without a doubt an 
intense need for multiple levels of system engineering application. 
For instance, the Apollo fire showed the need totake a real close 
look at all details for second order effects at all levels; it 
"embarrassed everyone into a new diligence!" 
7. 	 Ultra-sophistication -- There is a natural tendency to complicate 
or "sophisticate" rather than simplify. "Technical people were 
often required to justify why something could not be done more 
simply. " Intense reliability and quality questioning tended to 
These were not often attacked directly. When they showed up, they 
suffered from silence or lack of an advocate. 
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counteract this phenomenon. Realization that reliability 
analyses had not been made or assessed demanded a relook! 
8. 	 Loss of pride of accomplishment -- The de-individualization 
of many types of production work often led to a loss of incentive 
for individual pride of accomplishment. Motivation through 
communication and manned flight awareness overcame this. 
9. 	 Unconcern for procurement detail -- Technical people, 
especially, tended to think that they could-be unconcerned with 
procurement problems. Experience taught much, but a real 
problem still exists. 
Undesirable inherent influences exist in any large technical organiza­
tion. While those below may not be unique to Marshall experience, at 
least they did not dominate the Saturn program. Chief among them were: 
1. 	 "Grey areas" -- There were many difficulties which existed in 
deciding or showing just where the system people's responsibility 
ended and where the specialty element's began, both for laboratory 
systems people as well as for other systems people. Solutions 
were based on joint assessments to arrive at a consensus. 
Z. Trade off inconsistencies -- People trained and skilled in making 
the technical trade offs in optimization studies who also have the 
cost and contractual "feel" for trade offs were rare, but the 
'conflict" which resulted from those on "both sides of the fence" 
was a healthy one. 
3. 	 Program requirement/performance specification incompatibilities­
"It is nearly impossible to get program requirements to the same 
degree of rigidity which is desired for end item performance 
specifications, " but an intense effort has to be made. 
4. Lack of communication -- Getting the critical facts out of human 
beings is in marked contrast to most experimental and analytical 
procedures. As one technical manager stated: "This requires a 
knowledge of what the 'guy' is talking about, the rationale he is 
using, as well as a knowledge of his background. " 
5. 	 Trade off specifics vs generalities -- It is very difficult to put 
trade off capabilities into general requirements. Such a capability 
starts only in the system definition state. Eventually, the question. 
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must 	be answered; "What is expected of each subsystem in 
terms of failure probability? What accuracy is involved? 
What happens upon failure? How are repair and logistics 
accomplished? " 
6. 	 Lack of multiplicity of complimentary solutions -- "Of three 
or four different solutions to specific design requirements, 
only one is probably complimentary to the way that other people 
are solving their problems." 
7. 	 Shiftwork disadvantages -- The increase in traceability difficulties 
and an opposite effect from the desired pride of accomplishment 
were natural consequences of shiftwork. Paperwork and 
"staggering" may help, but the disadvantages still exist. 
8. 	 Interface definition resistance -- "Interfaces must be identified 
as early in a program as possible, but many engineers (particularl 
those in research) want to leave themselves a freer hand for 
'downstream' changes." 
9. 	 Lack of reward for non-hardware products -- The emphasis
 
had to be upon hardware, considering the goal of the Saturn
 
program. Therefore, the less viable products like software,
 
reliability, and planning, while indisputably contributing
 
significantly to the whole, often went unnoticed.
 
10. 	 Quick-solution thinking -- Educational development and successes 
and failures in their experience tended to make most individuals 
arrive at solutions as quickly as possible, solutions which were 
usually closely associated with their background. Constant 
effort had to be exerted to keep thinking requirements, encourage 
creativity, and strive to reach a solution that was best reaiisticall) 
11. 	 Technical bias -- A "not invented here" attitude continually 
reared its head in Saturn development. Impartiality in technical 
matters is a very difficult state of mind to reach. The proper 
frame of mind is to ask if the approach selected can do the job 
within the system constraints regardless of a preconceived 
notion of how it ought to be accomplished. 
12. 	 Inadequate planning-to-project information transfer -- Paperwork 
has been the prime transfer mechanism. Constant emphasis has 
had to be placed in this area for this to be efficient. It is far 
from 	what all concerned would like it to be! 
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13. 	 The assumption that technical ability = management ability --
Promotions were often based on this assumption. Without 
question, it has been often true, but instances where it was 
false led to problems. In any event, the transition of the 
individual from the technical to the management side is rarely 
made without immediate loss in a group's technical ability 
offset by only a gradual increase in management efficiency 
for a certain period of time. 
Another category which includes undesirable influences on Saturn 
or any large system development effort could be called systems considera 
tions. They include: 
1. 	 Status monitoring resistance -- Efforts needed to monitor the 
status of how the engineering of the system is "coming along" 
seem to meet with less cooperation than those concerned with 
monitoring of how the subsystem is "coming along." 
2. 	 Significant factor omission -- The difficulty of identifying all 
factors which affect the realistic solution in a system study is 
very real. There is a "need to do more studies that consider 
evaluation in the light of searching for the right answer except 
for certain influences, followed by consideration of how to 
reshape the solution with respect to them. " 
3. 	 System group obscurities -- How many good subsystem people 
should be moved to a systems group? Where should system 
groups resources come from? What should differentiate between 
systems functions and program management? 
Finally, some knowledgeable technical managers have estimated that 
it may take from three to five years to develop a group of strong disciplin 
people with persuasive personalities who can do good systems work. 
Obviously, all systems work cannot be within one organization (some 
have 	conjectured that if an attempt was made to do this, organizations 
devoid@d of systems capability would just develop it anyway). The time 
lag in establishing the real communication links between organizations 
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(both within MSFC and in MSFC-contractor relationships) that were 
required for effective engineering of systems were detrimental to 
program progress. 
Other Identifiable Mechanisms and Influences
 
The previous section has 
summarized many influences which were 
present during the Saturn Program. There are other influences which 
cannot be appropriately covered in any-way except in expository form. 
Surely, volumes could be written concerning each of these; but the im­
portance of each and their appropriateness to other system approaches 
is conveyed in the descriptions which follow. 
Leadership Characteristics 
Key leaders were instrumental in the Saturn success. Primary among 
their traits are (as pointed out in a previous section of this report): having 
very respected technical reputation, possessing an acutea system awareness 
and sensitivity to opinions of others, having a superior ability to question 
perceptively, and developing the ability to follow a question all the way down 
to the "nuts and bolts" when necessary. Although these are primary in 
importance, there are other traits that played an important role; as one 
description of a now retired leader indicates:
 
"He had a good background, he understood Marshall, he 
understood 
people, he understood strengths and weaknesses. He was sincere and 
honest; people could talk to him about problems. He had that human 
-26­
attribute that kept problems from being hidden from him. Maybe open­
ness is the key ... this shortened the learning curve so that we got up 
a full head of steam quickly." 
The magnetism of genius is very evident in a meeting with these indi­
viduals. But it is deeply more significant than popularity, or showmanship, 
or their "being a good guy. " If there is a creative minority, as Toynbee 
refers to 26, some And our nation and ourthese are of them. technology 
will always be in debt to that creativity so necessary for man's first ven­
tures into space. Alone they could not have done it, certainly, but scores ­
without them-without their creativity - would have failed as well. 
Departure from our societal concept of "leaders" took place in the 
Saturn Program to some extent, too. While many functions were perhaps
6 
carried out in "the boss said so" fashion, more often it was the atmosphere 
provided by management to allow a group of technical specialists (MSFC 
and contractor) to collectively assess technical data in arriving at technical 
truth that led to most decisions. Desk pounding, do-it-this-way, was not 
the order of the day. Age, rank, and position had little to do with one's 
importance in these technical assessments ! Certainly, there were many 
times when technical management made many critical decisions somewhat 
unaided, but their recognition of the technical advice from "below" them 
was of the highest esteem, and was rarely overruled. 
The single-individual influence and importance cannot be overemphasized 
in this day of corporate anonymity. Toynbee has observed: 27 
"... up to now, creative acts in the fields of thought ... have been 
the achievements of single minds ... only single minds can think 
thoughts and express them . .. There have never been such things as 
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collective thinking and -ollective writing" (in the sense that col­
lective work is limited by the best mind among its members). 
"But I am still more impressed by the inability of an intellec­
tual engineering enterprise to achieve, by teamwork, the result 
that (physical) engineering enterprises do achieve by it. A product 
of (physical) engineering teamwork - a bridge, dam, liner, battle­
ship, or skyscraper (or a Saturn) - is a structural unity. In work 
done by an intellectual team, the contributions of the single minds 
do not produce a structural unity... " 
Herein lies a startling recognition of systems-thinking troubles from a 
non-engineer and a non-scientist, but one who has searched diligently for 
truth in our world historical "system." The hardware is the congealing 
point, the test to see if we've done our intellectual job properly. It is an 
extremely subtle and difficult job to sway intfellectual positions and to 
arrive at intellectual collective judgments that eventually lead to system 
unity! 
Matrix Managemeit 
Matrix management, or some other similarly described concept, has b 
the subject of several studies (see, for instance, ref. 8). The major empi 
sis it seemed to receive on Saturn can be stated fairly briefly. Essentiall 
(and perhaps oversimplifying) this refers to the vertical and horizontal 
structuring of the organization, at least in concept, so that an analogy to a 
mathematical matrix is conceived. Usually, the vertical responsibility is 
with the "line" or hardware, or project elements of the organization. The 
horizontal, or across-the-board, responsibility includes those staff functic 
which have applicability to most, if not all, of the project elements themse 
In the case of Saturn, vertical elements consisted of the S-IC, S-II, and 
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S-IVB Stages, the IU, and vehicle GSE, etc. ; the horizontal functions in­
cluded testing, quality and reliability, systems engineering, program 
control, etc. 
There are natural tendencies, many of which have been mentioned 
elsewhere in this report, which tend to influence management to put most 
of the responsibility in the vertical structure (schedule commitments, 
easier to see "products" of hardware, etc.). Often lip service only is 
given the horizontal elements. Much of the Saturn success would have to 
be attributed to management's "equal treatment" of horizontal and vertical 
structures. One very important manner in which this was done was in 
monthly a-day program reviews. The first day was given to the vertical 
elements in "speaking to their problems"; the second day the horizontal 
functioning groups addressed theirs. Management listened to both! 
Interestingly, the natural tendency of not wanting to talk of problems had 
to be overcome - individuals thought they would recover and soon solve 
their problems. The required presentation of a recovery plan proved a 
tremendous forcing function in problem resolution. The extremely difficult 
to-document tie of visibility, openness, and communication and the role of 
individual genius in these just described functions were very instrumental 
to success. 
Finally,. this matrix idea pervaded the NASA-contractor relationship. 
Contractors were essentially the vertical elements with full responsibility 
for developing the hardware; NASA/MSFC filled the horizontal role to an 
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extent, using their pre-Saturn and early Saturn experience to help avoid 
pitfalls and integrate the various contractor efforts. 
Visibility 
In the engineering of complex systems, there is a consensus among 
most technical MSFC managers that good visibility plays a dominant role. 
It will not take the place of "eyeball to eyeball" communication, but it can 
augment the communication and problem highlighting functions of any 
organizational efforts. More though, than any of these identifiable mech­
anisms, visibility must be individually tailored to the system. 
What identifiable and transferable traits of visibility can be "written 
up" then? One is the means to show visually trends which develop. Another 
is that, to be effective, nearly all visibility must be with respect to time. 
A third is that the inability to depict a problem visually (through the use of 
a chart, graph, illustration, etc.) and to discuss it effectively in front of a 
group may be, and most probably is, an indicator of not having a full enough 
understanding for effective solution. 
With trends emphasized more than "status reporting, " problems may be 
highlighted early enough to shift resources or concentrate effort on correcting 
an undesirable trend. The inclination to replace some missed date with a new 
estimated date must be circumvented so that date slippages continue to "show 
up. " In essence, "know what you are trying to do (the plan) and know how 
you stand in getting there." 
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Visibility efforts within MSFC are not particularly unique, but they 
have not, in most instances, been relegated to frills or when-we-have­
time status. Instead, the support necessary to give them major signifi­
cance has been there. Austerity measures on follow-on programs could 
produce severe problems if shortsightedness cuts down on attention given 
this extremely important, but difficult to measure, attribute of successful 
engineering of systems. 
The author is well aware of the detriment attributed by too much charts­
manship, the difficulty of keeping up-to-date visibility, and of the human 
tendency to often equate good management to complexity and quantity of 
charts and graphs when often such is not the case. 
Verbatim comments concerning visibility were many. Sqme of them 
are: 
"Anything that Wfas complexity and bigness, will also have failure 
rate problems, quality problems, delays, aborts, it will be a real
'can of worms' ... problems cannot be avoided, so they must be 
made visible, they must be 'flushed up, ' you must force them 'out 
of the underbrush,' . . . monitoring and communication problems are 
tremendous. 11 
Flexibility of any such visibility must be stressed. There is very delicatea 
balance between too little, just enough, and too much! An Air Force report 
pertaining to lessons learned from management surveys of Air Force con­
tractors Z states in one of the more engineering-oriented lessons that there 
was: 
O'extreme difficulty of timely, accurate communication between large 
numbers of designers who have been educated and specialize in differ­
ent engineering disciplines and fields of technology ... important engi­
neering functions are unaccomplished and not detected until highlighted 
as a problem. " 
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What more evidence of lack of visibility could one find? And while Saturn 
experienced its share of similar problems, its ultirfate and continuing per­
formance speaks for itself! 
Working Groups, Task Teams, and Trade offs 
Vital to successful engineering of the Saturn system were the functions 
performed by groups composed of NASA and contractor technical personnel. 
The keyword which summarizes these successful efforts is multidisciplinary 
So many decisions are inherently affected by things which single discipline 
people do not often think of, that some type of mechanism must be used to 
effect interchange - and communication. 
It would be easy to paint a Utopian picture of working groups, etc. But, 
they have been the subject of much criticism and disdain. They were, how­
ever, considered successful enough by many for continuance in some form 
of panel, subpanel, or group on present ongoing projects. The indisputable 
fact remains that - single discipline groups cannot "go off by themselves" 
and expect to achieve success upon eventual functioning of the entire system! 
Working groups were not so much thought of - in their original conception 
as a system engineering function; they just seemed to be the best way to do 
the job. But in retrospect, there are probably many examples around us of 
failure of some "system" because the functions performed by the working 
groups do not get accomplished. For instance, such functions performed 
by a working group of sportsmen, recreationists, wildlife managers, sani­
tary engineers, industrialists, and water resource people would certainly 
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have arrived at non-pollution of any river as the best solution to a problem. 
Instead, we have seen industrialists make the decision to pollute many 
streams (without cognizance of or proper attention paid to "working group" 
recommendations) - probably because government was too timid at the 
time to enforce pollution measures on all, therefore giving those who took 
the 	steps to stop pollution an unfair economic disadvantage. Now we must 
all 	pay. 
In any event, the functions of the working groups are characterizable 
as 	follows: 
(a) 	Groups were interdisciplinary, but assigned areas were fairly 
specific (e.g., guidance and control, aeroballistics). Contractor 
members were most effective and most valued for their depth of 
technical specialization rather than their loyalty to a corporate 
"1position" or bias. 
(b) Many fundamental decisions of a technical nature were made by 
these groups (in contrast to individual technical or management 
decisions). Decisions were, in effect, the "life" of these groups. 
Everything was dedicated to arriving at the means of quantifying 
things to the point where good decisions could be made. 
(c) 	 Groups were "entirely ad hoc in nature. They had the proper mix 
of technical and management people with the decision-making 
authority invested in them to make on-the-spot decisions that would 
be backed up by program action." Membership changed as the 
agenda changed; they scheduled their own meetings as required. 
They took their cues from the visibility afforded by the monthly 
program reviews. They knew what the problems were because 
they "were there" and they set to work on them without waiting for 
release of minutes of the meeting. 
(d) 	Size was typically around 15 participants in the early stages, but 
other attendees who needed to know what was going (from otheron 
working groups, etc.) often pushed the total attendance up to 60. 
Later, as many as 50-75 participants took part. Eventually, they 
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got too large and outlived their usefulness as the system definition 
became more and more firmed up, most major decisions had been 
made, and most schedules and courses of action were established; 
i. e. , a more normal management and technical task was underway. 
(e) 	Often, tests or analytical programs were initiated to verify assump­
tions or to provide input data back to the working group to assist in 
"fine tuning on a course of action." 
(f) 	Interorganization and contractor- government and technical-program 
management gaps must be "bridged" for successful working groups.. 
(g) 	 Groups must operate "connected to the system as it exists. " 
(h) Dominant was problem solution; subordinate were organizational 
prerogatives. 
The following quote from a key NASA technical man best summarizes 
the 	working group function: 
"Often, in a group, there was not enough knowledge of the total 
problem - or of their interfaces with other areas. In fact, most 
problems were of that nature. Often the group would make some 
progress and then 'stall out' on two or three key issues because they 
did not have the knowledge and could not agree among themselves on 
how they would recommend to even solve the problem. This would 
result in the identification of open action items. Other groups would 
do the same. These would be compared by management where more 
often than not, superimposing a few management decisions or 'ground 
rules' allowed the process to continue. 
"So the working group system worked in that it could 'kick out' 
problems for further solution when the scope was beyond that which 
the group could handle . . . They were a very valuable management 
tool - even though many regarded it at that time as a very 'messy' 
way of doing business. I think I would still select that approach in a 
similar program... 
"This was a rather involved process over a 2-year program where 
not only did we sit and study approaches, make trade offs, and exercise 
judgment; we also actually instituted test programs, verified numbers 
to our satisfaction - even in early flight- and fed them back for com­
parison with analysis for further fine tuning. It was a complete end-to­
end process ... a developmental management technique." 
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"Change- isms" 
Changes are unavoidable! Two attitudes stand out in Saturn history. 
First is the acceptance of the evolving nature of the system - the inherent 
difficulty of developing absolutes of -system definition, and then proceeding 
toward completion of that system. Ideally, perhaps this is what each of 
us would like to avoid, but unfortunately - and realistically - it is practically 
impossible. It would be better to accept the necessity of system changes 
as they become imminent and to develop the planning necessary to (a) lessen 
their impact, (b) have the flexibility in the system to adapt to change, and 
(c) carefully weigh each change in a risk-assessment environment rather 
than a dictatorial "thou shalt not change" environment. 
Secondly is the fact that once system definition has "firmed up" to some 
type of baseline definition, considerations of the "what if we do, or what if 
we don't nature" must receive collective judgment assessments. The de­
sires of many technically oriented people to "do it better" must be weighed 
relative to cost and schedule problems. Changes which are approved 
usually affect other subsystems, or the overall system, and coordination 
must be effected! Each decision must be looked at in a very orderly process ­
a very important link in the systems chain! 
The change board mechanism which has various levels of change responsi­
bility (see fig. 3) seems a very appropriate mechanism - one which has many 
parallels in government, school systems, industry, etc. Why then was this 
mechanism on Saturn successful while some others in our "real world" seem 
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ANY CHANGE AFFECTING Iighest Approval 
MISSION CAPABILITY Level 
ANY CHANGE AFFECTING 
STAGE & GSE OR Aprova e 
OTHER STAGES Approval Level 
ANY CHANGE Lowest Approval 
AFFECTING STAGE ONLY Level 
FIGURE 3. SATURN CHANGE BOARD MECHANISM 
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unable to cope with change? I believe the answer lies in (a) the erroneous 
attitude in many real world situations which presupposes that the system, 
as conceived, will function as planned, (b) the use of many single-point 
decisions rather than collective technical assessments, and (c) the lack 
of ordered change mechanisms, with.adequate resources. More will be 
mentioned of this later in this report in the section on socioeconomic 
problems. 
In summary, an extremely perceptive MSFC key technical man made 
this remark: 
"Change boards were, in effect, review meetings where all the 
knowledgeable assessments were presented and understood. This led 
the board to a decision - or to a recommendation to the next higher 
level ... this was a very organized, preconceived fashion to supple­
ment many areas of management . . . many of the elements of good 
systems evaluation were certainly involved. ', 
Sensitivity, Professionalism, Attitude: Hard To Measure, But So Important 
One of the most technically qualified interviewees at the Center stated: 
"We have a lot of very capable, technically competent, engineers 
and scientists who do not have the slightest feel for what they are doing 
technically to someone else. They don't even ask the question. They 
assume that others will come to them! They think that 'if I do a good 
job on my part, and everyone else does too, on theirs; then the whole 
thing will work. ' They are not sensitive to the decisions that they are 
making at any particular time, that may reflect on the characteristics 
of the total effort of everyone in the final analysis " 
Every one of us can profit from real self-analysis of our own selves on this 
matter.
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There are three ways in which the proper sensitivity is developed: 
one is that many .seem to possess it naturally; second is that, if begun in 
the educational process, it has a tendency to grow; third, and probably 
the only way to reach those who did not obtain it by one of the first two 
ways, is that. of learning it in the "final, analysis" alluded to in the fore­
going quote. If this final analysis is not a part of the person's experience, 
then there is no way to go except for him 'to become narrower and narrower 
and less and less sensitive to others. As an example, the MSFC team 
experienced .many "final analyses" in missiles leading up to Saturn - many 
times when the hardware had to produce as it was supposed to. Sometimes 
it did not, and lessons were learned. Many disciplines' or endeavors never 
reach such a test; their final analyses remain theories, untested, unsens'i­
tized to the environment in which they must finally function. Now, certainly 
there is'much to be gained by theoretical, studies; many developments would 
never materialize if it were not for the intense efforts of many theoreticians. 
The point is, however, the experiences of taking a really-hard, realistic 
look at just what is to.be turned out by the group - ,whether it be a paper 
study, performance requirements, hardware, or students - is the best 
teacher of system awareness! The further away from actual performance 
in the physical world, the less effective will be the lesson'in system 
awareness!
 
The most serious problems facing our society today are the result of 
not having such a "final analysis" as a point of focus. While NASA/MSFC 
had the launch stages and the Instrument Unit, and while NASA/MSC 
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had the command module and the LEM, and while NASA/KSC had the launch 
complex, many universities and social problems have lacked such a focal 
point. The remainder of the report following the next section relates to 
universities and socioeconomic problems. 
The "Marshall Circle" 
One way to depict visually the MSFC system influence on Saturn is 
shown in Figure 4. This is a symbolic circle formed from strands of wire 
would into a "cable" and entwined with a helical "coil. 11A cross section is 
shown also on the figure. The strands of wire making up the "cable" are 
the disciplines representing the technical strength of the center - of necessity 
strongly consisting of the material of which they -have been made (their expe­
rience, education, etc.). The core of the "cable" represents the goal of the 
center, the internal boundary of each discipline. On the outer boundary is a 
helical coil, similar in concept to a recently patented Center development*: 
the patented item produces a magnetic field which can "adjust" what it sur­
rounds to meet critical tolerances. To call this coil system engineering 
would perhaps evoke too restrictive an idea of what group performs this 
function at MSFC. Instead, it is really system awareness, a function that 
has been performed by center top management and numerous organizations, 
but most of all on Saturn by dedicated individuals in various organizations 
who realized that it had to be done to meet the goal. Certainly, this 
permeated the MSFC-contractor relationships also! 
*Patent number 3, 507, 034, Schwinghamer and Bennight, Method and Apparatus 
for Precision Sizing and Joining of Large Diameter Tubes, April Zl, 1970. 
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FIGURE 4: "THE MARSHALL CIRCLE" 
On the closed loop - or circular form - of the "cable" are shown the 
many functions which comprise the center effort. If each individual in 
each discipline "strand" could continually be aware of the necessity for 
the complete circle, then successful engineering of systems can continue 
to be an MSFC trademark. 
The "coil" functi6n has much diversity of opinion as to who should do 
it, whether it should be organized or not, how to accomplish it, indeed ­
even what is the function in many cases! But without question, the technical 
management - those who have come up through the discipline areas - see an 
acute system awareness, with a reasonable attempt at partially organizing 
it, as a very realistic solution to the demands placed on the Center. 
Ironically, the goal - the core, and its definition; and the discipline spe­
cialists - the strands, and their attitude dictate to a very large degree the 
role which the system awareness (the coil) elements play. Need it be a 
python with its strength-sapping constriction, or should it not be more like 
a magnetic influence which provides an environment - a field - in which the 
disciplines function in structural unity? Experience has shown that as 
complexity increases, the need for centralization of many of the system 
awareness functions increases. Why prevent it from functioning by poor 
attitudes and organizational bickerings or the lack of an understandable 
goal?
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IMPLICATIONS TO UNIVERSITIES 
A New Role for the University? 
The universities do have a new role! It is not appeasement of those 
who would overthrow them. It is an increased capability to cope with 
problems and subsystem interrelationships. Any perusal of "university 
happenings" during the past years would indicate many university problems 
(not all, of course, have sources within the university itself). While efforts 
must be made to eliminate external problems, we must assume that some 
problem sources exist within the university systems themselves. Based 
on the present pattern, if they do not exist in some cases at present, they 
in all likelihood will soon develop. The university "system" is so complex 
and its response so difficult to stay ahead of, that a need for a vast increase 
in overall system considerations is imperative. The President of the Penn­
sylvania State University, Dr. Eric Walker, has asked, "can colleges face 
the future without making some really basic alterations in the general 
pattern of education?"-2 9 
There should be, now, a look back by universities at the Saturn success 
to see if there are ideas that can be applied for further improvement of the 
individual university system. With this in mind, and considering restrictions 
on the volume of this report, the reader must te careful not to interpret this 
section to be critical; nothing could be further from the truth! The author's 
convictions, and his observations of those interviewed during this study are 
completely contrary to the goals of those who find nothing good in our present 
university system and who attempt to bring about anarchy to achieve their goals. 
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Instead, it is hoped that this report and creative applications of some of 
its content to individual university systems might provide the catalyst for 
greater success of university missions. 
The University "System"l and Its Products 
In order to have a frame of reference for discussing "systems" with 
respect to universities, first, we should try to define the university system 
in some fashion. Can it "fit" into a recognized system definition? A NASA 
document2 0 says a system may be "an organized and disciplined approach to 
accomplish a task." An Air Force document 3 states that a system is "a com­
posite of equipment skills, and techniques capable of performing and/or sup­
porting an operational role." Finally, Machol in the System Engineering Hand­
book1 6 indicates that a system is something which has the following seven 
characteristics: (1) man-made, (2) has integrity - all components are contrib­
uting to a common purpose, (3) large, (4) complex, (5) semiautomatic, (6) has 
stochastic inputs, and (7) is usually competitive in some manner. Few ob­
servers would dispute numbers 3, 4, and 6, especially of late! 
The tremendous support given by numerous universities during the Saturn 
Program on the Saturn system hardware itself certainly fits in well with the 
AF definition. And few would dispute the university's meeting the NASA defi­
nition. It would remain, however, to define "task" in connection with the NASA 
definition, and to defihe "an operational role" in connection with the AF defini­
tion. Can we not accept Rosenstein, who in an excellent 12-year Ford Foun­
dation study2 3 states that ' .. the prime responsibility of the professional school 
(the university) must be the preparation of men (or women) who will understand 
and discharge the obligations of the profession(s)"? 
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However, the products of most universities today do involve more than 
just student outputs. Research, adult education, influence on other edu­
cational systems, scientific thought, conferences, research institutes, etc., 
.are but a few of their many diverse functions. In essence, however, each 
function had as its origin the thought that by performing such a function, and 
involving university elements in such functions, they would serve to better 
prepare students for performing well in their chosen field upon graduation. 
It would be naive to think that these original thoughts are still the dominant 
motivation today. A deeper analysis of our university system can result 
from a comparison of analogies and contrasts of it with respect to success­
ful Saturn systems engineering and the further considerations of its system 
characteristics which follow. 
Analogies Between Saturn and the University 
There are a number of parallels or analogies between the Saturn success 
and a successful university system. With Machol's system characteristics 
in mind: certainly each is man-made, each is large and complex, and each 
has a certain amount of stochastic inputs. Obviously, the Saturn is semi­
automatic much more than the university. Machol's meaning here is that 
man-machine interaction - computers and computer methods - are mandatory 
ii operation of the system. Obviously, too, the university must tend more
 
and more to having computers aid in system decisions, system flexibility,
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and system visibility if it is going to continue in a dominant role in our 
society. Saturn "competed" against nature's laws and tremendous odds. 
Universities compete: against other universities for budget and research 
funds; against other resource-desiring agencies; in fact, against time in 
striving to stay ahead of the "response" of the entities making up its 
system! Finally, Machol has indicated that, to be a system, the "some­
thing" must have integrity in the sens'e that "all components contribute to 
a common purpose." 
It is on this latter point that the analogy begins to break down. The uni­
versity has gradually veered away from any goal which unites its "component 
or subsystems. This contrast will be explored further in the next section. 
There are a number of analogies which space does not-permit alluding to 
here. But, as examples, the university has similarities to working groups 
and the change board mechanism essentially in its committee system. An 
analogy exists between working panels (which performed "working group" 
functions between NASA Centers) and ECPD accreditation teams. No attemp 
will be made to compare details of these analogies here; there is too much 
variance between universities, and between the missions of Saturn and our 
colleges. For instance, the assessment of the impact of a curriculum chang, 
is quite different from that of a Saturn hardware change. This is true in 
every instance where the real truth is quantifiably elusive ! Contrasts in the 
working group arrangements are discussed in the following section. 
It does seem that functions similar to those performed by Saturn change 
boards must receive greater emphasis in future university endeavors. 
Certainly an attempt should be made to obtain greater flexibility and quicker 
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response in curriculum and facility planning, student-faculty relations, 
"measuring" of teaching ability, and response to unforeseen changes in the 
university mission. On Saturn, change mechanisms received demanding 
attention and resources. If the university does not adequately recognize the 
change mechanism along with research and publishing, and the constant changes 
necessary in teaching content and teaching methods, then poor "system re­
sponse" will show up at some later time. Faculty members will perform well 
the "change mechanism" if they feel their efforts will bring meaningful results.* 
In analogy, too, the universities have many leaders in the "creative minor­
ity! " They have, however, a much less free hand in controlling the system 
than Saturn key leaders had. This is essentially because of inherent contrasts 
in the makeup and functions of the two systems and system outputs. The afore­
mentioned contrasts in intellectual vs. physical enterprises (see p. Z8) are 
infinitely appropriate here. It is absolutely imperative that we find ways to 
allow "the von Braun's of the university systems" to have more resources 
and more of an impact, to have a more effective means for overcoming uni­
versity parochial atmospheres, to be able to "speed up" the often slow response 
to change; and to reward them handsomely for it! Some of the observations in 
this study offer excellent possibilities in these areas. 
In this consideration of analogies, it seems that the university, too, often 
has quite a problem with sensitivity and attitude among its professors and 
administrators. Paraphrasing the statement (see p. 37): 
We (the university) have a lot of very capable, technically and 
scholastically competent professors and administrators who do not 
have the slightest feel for what they are doing to someone else. 
*See Reference 23, pp. IV-6 through IV-8. 
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They don't even ask the question. They assume that others will 
come to them! They think that 'if I do a good job on my part, 
and everyone else does too, on theirs; then the whole output of 
the university system will be fine. ' They are not sensitive to 
the decisions that they are making at any particular time, that 
may reflect on the characteristics of the total effort of everyone 
in the final analysis ! 
The same comments relating to development of this sensitivity within 
NASA engineers and scientiats definitely apply to these types within the 
university. 
Finally, Table I on the next page gives further analogies. 
Contrasts and Paradoxes Between Saturn and the University 
Outstanding in this category are (a) often the lack of a common goal, 
(b) no parallel to the "working group, " and (c) often a lack of visibility. 
The first two of these items are a direct result of the obvious trend of a 
university - the trend to attract, hold, and reward strong specialists. 
This alone dictates difficulties in items (a) and (b). 
The "goal" seen by individual faculty members is that which the uni­
versity "pushes" and rewards. It is usually the attainment of technical 
specialty strength, the very element which Marshall, itself, maintains 
most important in the Saturn success. But, Marshall technical manage 
ment is quick to add that this, by itself, without acute awareness of the 
overall system and system goals greatly limits the effectiveness of this 
most important element - except in reaching individual goals ! (An im­
portant contrast exists between Marshall's measurement of technical 
specialist strength and that of the university. Marshall hardware 'tests 
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TABLE I SOME 
Are the statements below true in our universities... 
There is an intense effort by many dedicated indi-
viduals who realize the necessity for cooperative 
efforts between departments in order to assure 
success of the system. 
Problem areas are addressed openly in "recovery 
plan" sessions. 
We constantly try to decide what we will do if things 
do not go as planned. All student failures have a 
reason; we always find out the real reasons why. 
No test or quarter or semester passes without being 
followed by an intense effort to extract all possible 
considerations to make the next one better. 
"Tiger teams" are used often rather than standing 
committees. Their recommendations are usually 
followed. 
POSSIBLE ANALOGIES? 
when compared to these Saturn observations ? 
Item 1, p. 15: System awareness -- This was an 
intense overall perspective possessed by dedicated 
individuals who realized the necessity for coopera­
tive efforts on subsystem development in order to 
assure success of the overall system. 
Item 2, p. 15: Technical issues -- The concen­
tration on these by management, working groups 
and panels, laboratory discipline groups, and in 
program reviews was without letup. Individual 
perceptive questioning and addressing problen 
issues in "recovery plans" played a very important 
part. 
Item 7, p. 17: Failures -- A controlled failure atti­
tude necessitated constantly promoting the idea, "let 
us do all we can to prevent any and all failures, of 
course; but if one occurs, what do we do then?" Too, 
failures were "planned for, " or anticipated. It was 
assumed some would occur in testing, for instance. 
No failures were left unexplained 1 
Item 13, p. 18: Post flight and post test evaluation --
No mission or test firing occurred without being fob­
lowed by an intense effort to extract all possible tech­
nical considerations from available data. 
Middle of p. 21: "Tiger teams, " short term appoint­
ments of capable individuals with related interests and 
diverse disciplines, were often used to pull together 
more needed facts to aid in joint assessments on just 
where problems were most likely to be.- Reviews of 
such assessments occurred periodically. 
and performances and collective personnel judgments are criteria. The 
university uses in the final analysis, essentially, publications. Is Toynbee's 
analysis of the "physical" structural unity as compared to lack of intellectual 
unity appropriate here? See Leadership Characteristics.) NASA itself has 
recognized this common goal problem on university research that was sup­
posedly multidisciplinary and common goal oriented, but which was in effect 
"sliced up and parceled out" to individual specialists. For instance: 
"The multidisciplinary aspect of (NASA) research grants has gener­
ally not been taken seriously by universities. The universities perceive 
the grants as institutional support in a conventional sense that does not 
require innovation in the administration of research. A contributing 
factor to this attitude is the lack of 'systems' administrators in uni­
versities with broad views of real-world problems and the capability 
for breaking problems into small subsystems for attack... Research 
involving individuals from multiple disciplines, including -social sciences, 
jointly attacking a multidisciplinary problem is nonexistent. "19 
A very strong exception to this observation is the NASA/ASEE Summer 
Faculty System Design Programs. Reference 28 describes the 1969 program 
at MSIFC directed by Auburn University. Individual faculty members will 
function as a multidisciplinary team if pilot team efforts receive recognition 
on a par with individual research efforts. 
The lack of a common goal could have several solutions. One would be 
for the ufiversity to reward part specialist - part generalist faculty mem­
bers more. Another would be to have more interdepartmental teams work­
ing together in common efforts, both research and teaching! In connection 
with the latter, some better means to convey system awareness to our 
students (and faculty, too) must be developed. A key MSFC electrical 
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engineer stated it thusly: 
"System engineering is an activity that you develop from the 
very beginning. One needs to end up sensitive to the fact that the 
design being done has to 'live' in the real world with other designs. 
This is a legitimate criticism with engineering education - when a 
6tudent is taught to design a gadget, he must also be taught to con­
sider more than just how well it does its job. How well can it 
really fit into the real world? How well can it be maintained? How 
well can it be integrated into the overall system of which it is a 
part? 
"Some people just naturally tend to do things simply. Others 
tend towards sophistication; many towards sophistication for its 
own sake. If a man is sensitive to the fact that the system exists 
for some purpose other than its own existence, and that it has to 
work with and be controlled by other things - if he is sensitive to 
variations in other subsystems - then it is a much broader outlook. 
If this were instilled in subsystem teaching and allowed to grow, 
then we would have 'automatic' system engineers when we get 
through.
 
"The 'sophistication' that starts occurring in later courses in 
college gives 'sort of a feeling of accomplishment in itself that 
leads to more of the same, but that very sophistication hides the 
very basic engineering we would like to get out of people! It's not 
that we don't need a certain amount of sophistication at times, but 
it must be in its place. One cannot get much more basic or funda­
mental than to develop - within engineers, scientists, professors, 
and students - a sensitivity to others' problems as he creates his 
own designs and generates problems for other people." 
One way to attempt to do this involving students would be to develop 
more interdisciplinary team effort studies - probably involving case 
studies. When and how this might occur would perhaps be the subject 
of many diverse opinions and, of course, many examples exist at present. 
The best stated consensus ideas from the interviews, however, are: 
"I'm not real sure of how well case studies work in under­
graduate education, but I do know that when you have a cadre of 
people together with expertise - that you can learn an awful lot 
by trying to understand the other guy's technical viewpoint, 
which is the beginning of system engineering." 
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"It would appear to me that we must assume that an engineer 
has been through one of the more traditional disciplines. On top
 
of that, he needs to develop a tolerance for other viewpoints.
 
There's nothing more intolerant than a person who has just re­
ceived his degree in a certain field or even worse - one who's 
worked in it (just in it) for a few years. He has lost all contact
 
with other considerations and other inputs. If there were some
 
way to get these people exposed to the large variety of things
 
which shape final decisions in some meaningful fashion. I don'C
 
think you can do it with a classroom approach too well. You need 
more classroom assignments where case studies are pursued, 
where actual problems are studied, where seminars are done 
properly. One could possibly construct a course around a series 
of problem situations where a group of discipline-oriented people 
of the right mix are thrown together on a problem and have to sort 
out all the parameters which have to be understood in order to 
make a decision, and have to participate in that process. And 
require each of these people to operate completely outside of his 
discipline area in doing this. He has to see that his discipline is 
there - and believe in it - but he is not able to call on his own 
resources for strength. Yet, he must participate in really identi­
fying the key trade-off factors which have to be studied and under­
stood and which relate to a decision. To me, the decision making 
process itself is the very essence of systems worl; the understand­
ing of what you have to understand to make the decision and how to 
go about getting the facts, and how to understand and interpret 
them. A banding together of several disciplines and a trial on 
several problems which are known to have all the proper attributes 
would be the best way to proceed on the undergraduate level. As 
many existing examples as possible where the outcome is known 
should be utilized. " 
One other point in connection with this lack of a common goal aspect: 
NASA executives indicated that "one must look at the conglomerate of the 
organization as a measure of the tool that you have." It would be naive to 
suggest that the university does not agree with this in principal. But, in 
reality, this is a very difficult frame of mind to mfaintain. Some parts of 
the "conglomerate" are better researchers; some arZe better teachers; and 
some are more prolific at publishing than others. Some fields are inherently 
more difficult in which to become established. The tendency, however, is 
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to "measure the tools" through use of those products which lend themselves 
to easiest measurement, usually publications and degrees (similar to num­
ber 9, p. 24). There must be a role for some non-Ph. D's and for professors 
with good practical experience. The best conglomerate need not be an all 
Ph.D. faculty which has experienced only an academic background in its 
development. 
The second contrast is that there is seldom a parallel to the "working 
group" concept within the university. One must understand just what role 
the working groups played within the Saturn Program to recognize all of 
the implications of this statement, so that section in a previous part of 
this report should be perused thoroughly. Certainly, there are attempts 
within the university to fulfill this function, but in general, they do not 
include the individual faculty member on a plane or to the extent that 
NASA Saturn/Apollo working groups involved the individual technical 
specialist. Part of the problem is the emphasis on the vertical manage­
ment structure of the departmental organizations with little intercommuni­
cation between similar specialists in different departments. This "feeds" 
the already existent problems inherent in having an organization of technical 
specialists in the first place. While the competition inherent between these 
organizations has some merit, the "competition" to collectively work as a 
team towards the accomplishment of some well coordinated goals has 
greater merit and usefulness. And it need not drastically diminish indi­
vidual accomplishment goals ! As examples of these points, several key 
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MSFC technical managers have the following comments to offer; their 
appropriateness to universities is very evident even though the comments 
were made in relation to the Saturn Program: 
"Often, meetings with all system elements were held in one 
room (Mission Planning Working Group). It was decided in this 
meeting who needed to do further studies. One reason for these 
decisions was to conserve resources, to depend on everyone in 
the system knowing what the others were doing, so that each job 
would be done only once-- and yet all parts would fit together. 
(It hasn't always been done this way; when more resources were 
available, a job could probably have been done at five different 
places and comparisons made.)" 
"People understood that they were not working in a vacuum 
and that they had to trade off with others--they could not make 
arbitrary decisions. Often though, detailed technical specialists 
will look at too narrow a field, particularly in the lower elements 
of the organization where they do not have an opportunity to see 
the big picture. That is one reason why communication channels 
must be kept open--all the way up to the top. " 
The tie-in of this contrast in working group concepts with generalists­
specialists problems and with difficulties in goal focal points is very real; 
A third sharp contrast concerns visibility. Certainly, this may vary 
considerably from university to university and from level to level. But, 
generally speaking, NASA views this as less of a frill and of more im­
portance than does the university. One very important reason for this 
has been the menial budgets available to many universities during the long 
"push" to bring faculty salaries up to respectable levels. Visibility is one 
of those areas that just takes a certain amount of funding to do any good at 
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all and has been treated as secondary at universities. Its use in high­
lighting problems and staying in tune with responses of the system is 
just as appropriate and needed in the university system as it was, and 
is, in Saturn. Too often, it is "one of those things one needs to do, 
but somehow gets left behind in the race to do the things one has to do. 
And yet, it can mean the difference between right decisions and wrong 
decisions, between "controlling" the system or losing control, or 
between successful system output (students) and subpar output perform­
anc e. 
Several suggestions concerning the visibility role of the university 
would be: realistic time line analyses of faculty workloads, flow charts 
or charts similar to PERT/CPM use for student milestones in meeting 
degree requirements, etc. , and course sequence and prerequisite wall­
boards showing content and interdependence of courses. All of these 
are usually covered in a mass of catalogs, files, or in minds of indi­
viduals on campus, but clear visibility would make for a much more 
efficient system. While computers inare used extensively universities 
today to aid in handling masses of data, an order of magnitude increase 
of visibility of this data must occur with respect to the system output, 
the students. Other than individual counseling, usually on an asked-for 
basis, there is little visibility used to highlight upcoming student prob­
lems--technical, social, or otherwise. Computer and computer graphics 
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0 
could be used with trend analysis to gain a significant increase in 
measurement of how our "product" is coming along in performance. 
For example, while not completely "tied" to visibility, figure '5 
gives an indication of what could occur when a real conscious effort is 
made at using visibility in classroom teaching (including the availability 
of illustrators, etc. , being made available to faculty). This particular 
figure is a plot of the percent of students with a "C" average or better 
versus years for two classes of engineering schools, and the engineering 
school where this program was put into effect. 18 The tremendous in­
crease in motivation necessary to achieve such results can ocdur when 
visibility is used. Interestingly though, as in Saturn, it is concern for 
eventual good performance of the output product that is the motivating 
influence behind visibility use ! As with almost anything, visibility for 
visibility's sake is not the answer. To get existing people to change 
their way of doing things will require an extreme concern for the final 
product and the role which visibility can play in the development of that 
product!
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A SMALL STEP FOR EDUCATORS: A GIANT LEAP FOR EDUCATION 
The collective outputs (people) of university' systems, some American 
and some European, dominated the Saturn success. These "alumni" of 
Saturn do not look at education and condemn it. But they do feel that there­
are improvements - to varying degrees - which could be made in much of 
education to have a tremendous impact for enhancement of a deeper sense 
of professionalism among our future engineers and managers. 
From within the ranks of education itself, Eric Walker, president of 
Pennsylvania State University and the National Academy of Engineering, 
outlines many steps towards this end in reference 29. His discussion of 
the "inadequacies of the (university) system" and the "need for real 
change" must receive our demanding attention. In summary, he points 
out that our university systems have "failed to question the fundamental 
validity of many basic concepts, "1 especially those related to standardi­
zation of many methods and traditional patterns which lead to student 
impersonal feelings. He states that "many practices are based upon 
time-honored conventions which are never questioned. They hem us in 
for no good reason. It is merely that things have always been done this 
way." Among these practices mentioned are (a) years of study required 
for degrees, (b) course credit problems, (c) lecture length, and (d) prob­
lems with the lecture idea, itself. Constraints of course updating, 
schedule, classroom problems, and the economics of teaching are 
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discussed. Finally, Dr. Walker calls for an "increase in productivity 
in American education" and release from "operational procedure that 
'has held higher education in the kind of bondage it has been in for so 
many years. ' 
The elements essential to the Saturn success and delineated in this 
study can provide effective guidelines for this break from tradition. Only 
through the von Braun's of the universities and changed attitudes of faculty 
can the environment for more effective university "working groups, " 
"change boards, " visibility, and system awareness be promoted by the 
university. It must be a top-to-bottom function. Realistic solutions for 
university problems can and must be obtained. "Small steps" by each 
member of the "university team" can provide a "giant leap." 
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CAUTIONS AND ANALOGIES FOR SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
"All problems, when solved, are simple! ", a favorite professor 
of mine often said. In this frame of. reference, MSFC technical manage­
ment is divided as to whether the solution to some of the present 
socioeconomic problems of the United States (and of the world) will 
be easier or more difficult than putting a man on the moon and subsequent 
space activities. But they are in complete agreement that there are 
many transferable techniques, attitudes, philosophies, etc., that 
could have major significance in solution of our socioeconomic 
problems! (This class of problems is intended to include, but not be 
limited to; air pollution, water pollution, urban problems, transportation 
system problems, etc.) 
First, and very important, is the point that while technology may 
be held at fault by many for causing these problems (often unjustly), it 
is through some advance in technology that a major part of the solution 
can usually be found. For instance, in pollution of the air by the auto­
mobile engine, some technological means to enable energyan source 
to generate power without polluting must be a very important element 
of solution! In this respect, NASA has much technology which is 
appropriate; it is not the intent of this report to deal with such. Only 
someone who is woefully ignorant of the facts could dispute such a claim. 
The point is, that all the public interest, congressional pressures, etc., 
will not supplant technical capability and rigor. A reemphasis of the 
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three must basics of the INTRODUCTION of this report is strongly 
made in this respect. Very closely tied to this is instrumentation 
used to obtain data. Decisions cannot continue to be made so much 
on opinion or "do-gooder" philosophysing, in the socioeconomic area. 
The consensus of all interviewees was perhaps best stated by the 
following: 
"It would be hopeless to try to solve some of these (socio­
economic) problems without using a systems approach. First, 
define the problem exactly, and how you are going to develop 
the solution, properly and scientifically gather the data, under­
stand the validity of the data, test it and check validity if necessary. 
Then lay out a logical well-ordered process of coming to a 
decision... 
On the other hand, many expressed concern at the typical fill-in-the­
blank comment, "Now that we've been to the moon, we can 
Nothing could be much further from the truth in many instances. While 
the Saturn Program was certainly not devoid of people problems and 
political problems, many cohtrasts between the different types of problems 
do exist which will requiie traversing a very bumpy road of experience 
before success will be enjoyed. 
In somewhat of a chronological order, some of the problems and 
pitfalls which face our nation, and our world, in solving the socioeconomic 
problems can be stated as follows. There is the difficulty of obtaining 
a consensus on just what goals should be. Connected to this is a 
superficial look by many John Q. Publics, and a complete lack of 
realization of time and money constraihts in attacking problems. Many 
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want to take steps 3 and 4 before taking steps 1 and 2. Most do not 
accept the reality of Murphy's Law' in socioeconomic problems - which 
those of us in engineering have learned by experience to be often realistic. 
The human problems which are at present so difficult to quantify will 
greatly influence success of even carefully thought out systems approaches. 
(A recent article (10) discussed how importantly an individual's desire 
to 'control his own locomotion' has influenced the 'failure' of so many ­
even well designed - mass transit systems to date! Another example 
is that the role of human emotions in transportation problems - those -­
on land and the SST type - is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
simulate mathematically. Self indicting, of course, are many examples 
which show that giving financial help alone to many individuals does not 
take care of the problems for which financial help was opinionated as 
the solution!) Perhaps this point could be more vividly illustrated by 
asking ourselves, what complications would occur (aside from greater 
technical problems) if the Saturn/Apol16 Program goal now were one of 
transporting the U. S. population in its entirety to the moon? The human 
problems in such a venture are not too much more difficult than in some 
of our socioeconomic problems. 
What next then, assuming that goals can be established, and some 
basic decisions made to apply resources within a long enough time frame 
'Briefly, "if anything can go wrong, it will go wrong. " (A corollary 
is "and it will right away!") 
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for problem solution? Will there have to be a skipping of intermediate 
or early steps in order to arrive at some unreasonable evidence of 
success in order to assure continued support? Will steps that are too 
big be attempted? Will abrupt curtailments of large projects begun with 
enthusiasm take such a wasteful toll in careers (individual and corporate), 
and in the resultant human misery that follows, that many will wonder at 
its worth? 
Visibility and individual responsibility are the key elements from 
this point on! Indisputably there must be more than the present cry, 
"We must stop pollution. "1 Good plan and problem-piece definition must 
exist with some focal point for various groups attacking the problem 
toward which they may orient themselves. Organizational interfaces 
must be described with the necessity for reaching a realistic solution 
ever in mind; with some means for groups to get together!Zl Someone 
or some organization must be looking at the optimum solution! For 
instance, in reference to the socioeconomic problem of pollution, Lenher 
in ref. 14 has observed: 
"What is lacking, most basically, is a clearly defined national 
policy on the environment, a straightforward statement of what we 
are trying to achieve. . . this can only come from the Federal 
Executive... time is running out... now we must clean up the mess. 
The question is not whether, but how.. . industry has the job that is 
easiest to define... the university role (is)... as important as 
industry's... " We need "more sharing of ideas across company and 
industrial boundaries, and more cross-links to univeisity and govern­
ment laboratories... we need to change our patterns of technical 
thought, to approach the problem in the round, in terms of resource 
use and overall environmental impact. 
-61­
"What is still unclear is how unaversity resources can best be 
applied... There aren't any neat answers or obvious ways to 
organize this. The environmental program is larger than any 
single discipline or university department. . . But at the same 
time, each discipline has some special tools that apply to specific 
parts of the problem, and the tools aren't made of interchangeable 
parts... 
"How-we merge these talents where they must be merged, and 
still keep the tools separate where they are discrete, is a neat 
question... 
In this problem of pollution, as well as in many other social prbblems, 
the implication that success is equated with profit is an attitude that will 
not be easily overcome. But the Saturn experience would dictate that 
this equation should be technical truth equals success equals profit! 
In many other socioeconomic areas, the influence of strong sub­
system people, who "flaunt" their particular subsystems with no regard 
for the system has been very evident in the news lately. In the Saturn 
Program, these types could be "quieted, " or made to see, by engineerin 
test results. But how does one win over those who openly admit their 
desire to rip asunder the system with little "reason" behind them? 
Perhaps the truest test of a system approach will be to find ways to con­
vince these people that they are a part of the system and they can con­
tribute useful ideas toward a successful "system" rather than tear it 
down and replace it with their own "subsystem." 
An irony of ironies would be for teams to.apply the systems approacl 
in attacking problems involving human beings, while failing to recognize 
the spiritual "subsystem" and its tremendous influence on the hearts of 
men. Many are the problems which will defy solution without changes 
occurring within hearts of individuals 1 
-62­
Finally, to ignore the influence of education and the news media on 
all of these problems would be naive. The human tendency to really 
learn only by experience and mistake may be the only way we as a nation 
will learn the power of such influence. The following quote from a 
foreign born engineer-scientist who saw irresponsible use of such 
influence destroy a foreign nation speaks more eloquently than many 
volumes 
"Great is the power of speech, great is the power. of 'printing... 
the biggest danger in this country (any country) today is the power 
of television, radio, mass media communication. It can be a 
wonderful tool, but a very dangerous tool... Education and mass 
media can do wonderful things - and can destroy a nation!" 
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APPENDIX 
It has been the intent that this be a tell-it-like-it-is report; done 
with the belief and hope that NASA/MSFC does.have-what-it-takes to 
meet the space (and many non-space) challenges of the future. While 
there is an emphasis upon what is good about systems as opposed to 
what is bad, the study should not be taken out of the context that dedicatec 
technical competence is assumed, not disregarded! 
In the beginning, a study of much of the literature on systems 
engineering was undertaken. This has played an important part in the 
author's background in the subject. The author's attendance and/or 
familiarity with several system engineering courses contributed to 
this considerably, too. A RSIC search on systems engineering yielded 
434 pages of printout of source literature. Most of this consists of 
technical application reports; little on methodology or "how to do it. 
The 148 pages of printout on man-machine systems was similar, with 
many duplications. Many of the best documents were unlisted, but 
were uncovered in informal contact with various people. 
Perhaps a debatable assumption made in the beginning was that of 
not developing a questionnaire or formalized interview routine. It was 
felt this would limit the outlook of the overall study. Encouragement 
was given for each individual interviewed to delineate what systems 
engineering meant to him, ways and means of achieving the Saturn 
success, pertinent illustrations or documentation, and key techniques 
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or factors with which he was familiar. In addition, some ideas relative 
to engineering education and the role systems engineering should play 
in it were solicited. Finally, due to the present national interest in 
socioeconomic problems, the delineation of problems and pitfalls which 
Saturn people could foresee in application of the systems approach to 
them seemed an appropriate interview topic. It is possible that a 
quantifiable approach to interviewing would have been better, but hope­
fully, what has been done is closer to reality. 
Some faith in NASA /MSFC's promotion schemes has certainly been 
instrumental in acceptance of interview ideas. In other words, it is 
believed that most of what the middle to upper management people said 
is an outgrowth of their varied backgrounds and is important, therefore 
a consensus was not necessarily required. 
Primarily, those interviewed are listed below. Only a very few 
contractors were contacted as the emphasis was kept to MSFC.. Quotes 
have not been identified -with any individual and since others were inter­
viewed who are not listed here, quotes need not have come fr.om those 
below. Most of them did, however. Time did not permit interviewing 
others who would have had significant input. 
J. 0. Aberg - Chief, Requirements Integration Division, S&E-CSE-S 
W. 	 Angele - Chief, Manufacturing Research and Technology Division,
 
S&E-ME-M
 
J. A. Bethay - Director, Center Plans and Resources Office, A&TS-CP-DIR 
W. A. Brooksbank - Manager, 	 Space Station Task Team, PD-SS-MGR 
K. K. Dannenberg - Contract COR, Space Station Task Team, PD-SS 
P. T. Farish - Manager, Systems Safety and Manned Flight Awareness 
Office, 	 PM-SS-MGR
 
AQ
 
R. 	 E. Godfrey - Manager, Saturn Program Office, PM-SAT-MGR 
E. 	 Goerner - Director, Preliminary Design Office, PD-DO-DIR 
J. C. Goodrum - Director, Advanced Program Support Office, PD-PS-DIR 
C. 	 H. Grace - Manager of Engineering and Facility Operations - Space 
Facility, IBM, Huntsville, Alabama 
D. 	 Grau - Director, Quality and Reliability Assurance Laboratory, S&E-
QUAL- DIR 
T. 	 U. Hardeman 
- Director, Financial Management Office, A&TS-FIN-DIR 
K. 'L. Heimburg 
- Director, Astronautics Laboratory, S&E-ASTN-DIR 
0. 	 M. Hirsch - Manager, Contracts Office, PM-CO-MGR 
D. 	 K. Huzel - D/199-500, SLO5, North American Rockwell, Downey, Calif. 
J. 	 E. Kingsbury -Deputy Director, Astronautics Laboratory, S&E-ASTN-
DIR 
W. 	 R. Lucas - Director, Program Development, PD-DIR 
W. 	 R. Marshall - Chief, System Layout and Integration Division, PD-DO-S 
G. 	 F. McDonough - Technical Assistant, Science and Engineering, S&E-DIR 
B. 	 Moore - Director, Astrionics Laboratory, S&E-ASTR-DIR 
W. 	 A. Mrazek - Manager, Space Shuttle Task Team, Program Development, 
PD-DIR 
E. 	 W. Neubert- Acting Deputy Director, Technical, DEP-T 
L. 	 G. Richard - Technical Deputy Director of Science and Engineering, 
S&E-DIR 
R. 	 Schwinghamer - Chief, Materials Division, Astronautics Laboratory, 
S&E-ASTN
 
R. 	 T. Smith - Manager of I. U. Program Office, IBM, Huntsville, Alabama 
E. 	 W. Smythe - Manager of System and Product Engineering, IBM, 
Huntsville, Alabama 
B. 	 H. Sneed - Director, Program Planning Office, PD-PP-DIR 
The 	assistance of each of these has been tremendous. In addition, the 
author wishes to express sincere appreciation to Mr. J. W. Wiggins, A&TS-
TU-DIR, and Mr. S. E. McCrary of A&TS-TU. Mr. McCrary's help in final 
editing was especially meritorious. Special thanks are due Mrs. Nell Clay of 
A&TS-TU and to Mrs. Gayle Wynne and Mr. M. I. Kent of AST-U. 
Comments are solicited. They may be addressed to either: 
Dr. M. A. Cutchins or Mr. J. W. Wiggins 
Aerospace Engineering Dept. NASA 
Auburn University 	 A&TS-TU-DIR 
Auburn, Alabama 36830 	 Marshall Space Flight Center, 
Alabama 35812 
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